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MISPLACED POPULIST RAGE: CONGRESSIONAL MISSTEPS WITH
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION LIMITATIONS IN THE BAILOUT
LEGISLATION
Joseph Filloy*
The American people are angry about executive compensation, and rightfully so.
Many of you cite this as a serious problem, and I agree. We must find a way to
address this in legislation without undermining the effectiveness of the program.
—Former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson
testifying before the House Financial Services
Committee1
Most of us sign on to do jobs and we do them best we can. . . . [But] we’re told that
some of the most highly paid people in executive positions are different. They need
extra money to be motivated!
—Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman of the House
Financial Services Committee2
In business as in life, you don’t get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate.
—Dr. Chester Karrass3
Starting in the summer of 2008, the United States and most other
economies of the world began to feel the effects of the subprime mortgage
crisis. In response, the federal government enacted The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) to help restore stability to the U.S.
economy.4 Ultimately this legislation, commonly referred to as “the bailout
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bill(s),” would result in substantial outlays of taxpayer money to financial
institutions deemed systemically significant, or “too big to fail.”5
In March 2009, the American public became aware that “bailed out”
institutions would be making large bonus payments to their executives and
employees. A groundswell of populist outrage erupted.6 Indignation over
compensation became so emphatic that employees of bailed-out institutions
received death threats, and bailed-out corporations were forced to hire armed
guards to protect their office buildings.7 One group of outraged citizens
organized a bus tour stopping at AIG executives’ homes to ensure AIG
executives would hear their protests.8
Politicians were quick to jump on the populist bandwagon. Any politician
worth her mettle must possess the ability to recognize which way the winds
of popular sentiment are blowing and adjust accordingly. Their professional
duty is to represent their constituencies. Because their constituents were
outraged over the bonus payments, the politicians’ response was only natural.
Members of Congress publicly lambasted bonus compensation payments.9
President Obama insisted that such compensation should not be tolerated.10
The House of Representatives swiftly passed H.R. 1542, a bill that proposed
a 90% tax on bonus compensation made by bailout recipients.11
Despite their reactionary criticisms, members of Congress had recognized
the potential for abusive bonus in the bailout legislation’s gestation period.
Some members voiced their desire for strict compensation limitations for
corporations receiving federal funds; however, they faced opposition for their
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stance on executive compensation.12 President George W. Bush’s
Administration, in particular Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson,
opposed stringent regulation of executive wages.13 Secretary Paulson argued
that if significant limitations on executive pay were tied to federal aid, firms
would refuse to participate in aid program, thereby damaging the efficacy of
the stabilization plan.14
Because of the political wrangling during the passage of EESA, little
progress was made in the battle to curb excessive executive compensation.
Nevertheless, proponents of regulating executive compensation were able to
make significant changes to how corporations compensated their executives
with the ARRA. The purpose of this Note is to explore the political
negotiations surrounding the passage of the EESA and ARRA, with the aim
of addressing whether opponents of executive compensation regulation had
a legitimate claim during the negotiations surrounding the EESA. Specifically,
could a corporate board of directors refuse federal aid because of the
limitations placed on executive pay? A second purpose of the Note is to
examine the legislative decision to address excessiveness in executive
compensation and the need to stabilize the economy in the same bill. This
Note argues that by packaging its solutions to these two distinct problems
together, Congress hindered its ability to resolve each problem effectively. In
Part I of this Note, I will survey the political and economic landscape
surrounding the passage of EESA and ARRA. In Part II, I will discuss the
limitations placed on executive pay by the EESA and the subsequent
amendments in ARRA. Part III discusses potential ramifications of a board of
directors’ decision to reject federal aid because of the limitations placed on
executive pay. Part IV concludes the Note with a discussion of congressional
effectiveness.
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PART I—ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKDROP BEHIND THE PASSAGE OF
EESA AND ARRA
I believe if the credit markets are not functioning, that jobs will be lost, the
unemployment rate will rise, more houses will be foreclosed upon, GDP will
contract, that the economy will just not be able to recover in a normal, healthy way,
no matter what other policies are taken.
—Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke15
And we need a rescue plan. This is—it’s hard work. Our proposal is a big proposal.
And the reason it’s big and substantial is because we got a big problem . . . [t]here
are disagreements over aspects of the rescue plan, but there is no disagreement that
something substantial must be done.
—President George W. Bush16
I don’t think a single call to my office on this proposal has been positive.
—Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio)17
The subprime mortgage crisis loomed over the global economy during the
summer of 2008.18 Pundits, politicians and journalists could see the precipice
approach, but no one could predict the calamitous results of the eventual
meltdown. On September 16, following its decision to takeover mortgage
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury Department and Federal
Reserve announced the rescue of one of the world’s largest insurers, American
International Group (AIG).19 Meanwhile, the same agencies allowed the
venerable investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail.20
The following day the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) closed 450
points lower than its previous close.21 In the subsequent three weeks, the DJIA
would take a precipitous fall, flying past the 10,000 point mark, finally
meeting some resistance at 8,451 points, forty percent down from its all time
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high reached a year before on October 12, 2007, almost one year to the date.22
The S&P 500 lost nearly a quarter of its total value during the same three
weeks.23 Every world market felt similar declines, including a twenty-plus
percent drop in the Russian RTS, prompting the index to suspend trading
indefinitely.24
Market shocks of this magnitude had not occurred or manifested since the
Great Depression. Accumulated wealth simply vanished. Americans were
lucky if their retirement funds, typically heavy on securities, retained half of
their pre-shock values.25 Irresponsible borrowing and lending, coupled with
the securitization of risk, created an environment of great uncertainty. When
the market for toxic subprime debt disappeared, banks that had securitized the
debt and held it as assets on their balance sheets were forced to take colossal
write-offs.26
While the markets plummeted, uncertainty surged. Credit markets began
to freeze as banks unsure about the strength of their holdings and crippled by
write-offs became reluctant to loan what little capital they had left.27 The
credit freeze allowed problems for the banks to ripple throughout the
economy.28 Before the shock, a constant flow of credit allowed corporations
to rely on short-term debt for working capital.29 Once lending started to dry
up, corporations that had become dependent on commercial paper markets
struggled to secure the money necessary to make payroll and cover overhead.30
Concurrently, consumers stopped spending.31 Lacking customers for revenue
or the ability to obtain credit, businesses were forced to lay off hundreds of
thousands of workers.32 As unemployment doubled, and spending continued
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to slow, Americans began to wonder if the economic downturn would ever hit
bottom.33
The Man with the Plan
Meanwhile Congress, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and President
Bush scrambled to keep the sinking ship afloat. After a primetime nationwide
address, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson submitted a proposal for
governmental action in response to the various crises. Published on
September 20, 2009, the three-page proposal was remarkably thin on details
and entirely devoid of oversight. In fact, the Paulson proposal requested the
authority to purchase $700,000,000 in assets while asserting all transactions
would be “non-reviewable . . . by any court of law.”34
Three days later, Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairmen Ben
Bernanke presented the three-page proposal to the Senate Banking Committee.
The Committee categorically rejected the proposal.35 Committee Chairman
Senator Christopher Dodd chastised the proposal as “stunning and
unprecedented in its scope and lack of detail.”36
To address the crisis, the Bush Administration planned to increase capital
in the banking system.37 The Administration had faith that by providing banks
with capital, banks would be more likely to make loans, which in turn would
unfreeze the credit markets and return the economy to normalcy.38
The plan targeted nine of the nation’s largest financial institutions for the
first injections of capital. These nine institutions held 55 percent of the United
State’s banking assets and were considered “systemically significant to the
operation of the financial system.”39 In order to minimize risk to taxpayers,
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only healthy, viable, institutions would be eligible for funding.40 Because the
Administration considered the institutions healthy, their participation in the
program would be voluntary.41
In the weeks that would follow, the House and Senate fattened the
Paulson/Bernanke plan into acceptable legislation. The process was arduous.
At times it appeared as though negotiations might unravel creating
catastrophic government action unseen since Hurricane Katrina. As concern
over that possibility mounted, President Bush was forced to step in; he called
a press conference to assure the American people failure to act would not be
tolerated.42 Congress ultimately capitulated bringing the Administration’s
bank capitalization program to life with the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA).43
Executive Compensation Throws a Wrench in the Works
Executive compensation became a major sticking point. Criticism of
executive compensation packages has been pervasive in the American political
and corporate landscapes for the better part of the past two decades. As the
United States economy turned the corner on the stagflation of the 1970s,
corporations realized greater profits. Significant increases in the overall
compensation for executives accompanied these corporate gains. In 1978 the
average chief executive officer (CEO)’s compensation was thirty-five times
more than that of the average worker. By 2005 that ratio swelled to 262 times
the size of the average worker’s pay.44 Between 1991 and 2001, CEO
compensation grew by a rate of nearly 340%,45 while growth in employee
wages was relatively stagnant over the same period.46
Secretary Paulson, former CEO of the investment bank Goldman Sachs,
argued that limitations on executive pay would negatively affect participation
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in the stabilization program.47 Paulson went on record saying, “Let’s talk
about executive salaries. There have been excesses there. I agree with the
American people. Pay should be for performance, not for failure. But we need
this system to work, and so we—the reforms need to come afterwards.”48
Many members of Congress expressed a different perspective. They
viewed the bailout legislation as an appropriate vehicle to address the
perceived excesses in executive compensation.49 In the years prior to the
subprime meltdown, large executive bonuses on Wall Street became
commonplace. Bonuses for Wall Street firms totaled $33.2 billion in 2007;
seven of the largest investment firms increased executive compensation to
$122 billion, a 10% increase over 2006 wages, despite collectively recording
$55 billion in losses and $200 billion in cumulative losses to shareholder
value.50 Four of those seven firms would receive bailout funds—Goldman
Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch; two would be
acquired by other firms receiving federal funds—BearStearns and Morgan
Stanley; and one—Lehman Brothers, would fold.51
Support for limiting compensation came from both sides of the aisle.
Representative Barney Frank, Democrat and ranking member of the House
Financial Services Committee, put forth a proposal which would give the
Treasury the authority to set “appropriate standards” for executive
compensation for firms receiving bailout funding.52 The proposal also
included a provision giving corporations the authority to “claw-back”
compensation payments already made.53 Republican presidential candidate
Senator John McCain called for a strict cap on executive compensation at a
level of $400,000, the same wage paid to the President of the United States.54
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Fearful that the bailout would save Wall Street and not Main Street,
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama summed up the sentiment
of many Americans when he stated, “Taxpayers shouldn’t be spending a dime
to reward CEOs on Wall Street while they’re going out the door.”55 Instead of
having their taxes spent on economic recovery and increasing liquidity,
Americans feared corporations would use bailout funds to compensate the
same executives and managers they considered responsible for the crisis.56
If at First You Don’t Succeed . . .
As I will discuss in detail in Part II, the limitations on executive
compensation found in the final version of EESA were ultimately nominal. As
of December 21, 2008, 116 financial intuitions had received $188 billion from
the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) authorized by EESA.57 Despite
regulations on executive pay, top executives’ compensation at these firms
receiving bailout funds collectively totaled $1.6 billion.58
The American public responded to the bailout with mixed opinions,
ranging from great antipathy to complete skepticism. Protestors marched in
many major American cities.59 One poll noted only 28% of Americans
supported the bailout.60 Congress recognized the need for more legislation.
Following the election of Barack Obama, Congress immediately got to work
on the second piece of bailout legislation, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (AARA).61
On February 4, while the ARRA was making its way through the Senate,
President Obama released his proposal for executive compensation
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regulation.62 President Obama broadcasted his concerns, “For top executives
to award themselves these kinds of compensation packages in the midst of this
economic crisis is not only in bad taste—it’s a bad strategy—and I will not
tolerate it.”63 The President’s plan proposed capping executive compensation
at $500,000.64 Additionally, incentive-based bonus payments would be
confined to grants of stock options, redeemable only after all corporate
obligations to the government were repaid.65
The week after President Obama released his proposal for executive
compensation, the House Financial Services Committee, poised to get tough
on executive compensation, called on the heads of the nine “systemically
significant” financial institutions to testify about the first round of the
bailout.66 Citing public anger over the perceived failures of the bailout,
Committee members preceded to brow beat these CEOs for, among other
things, extraordinary salaries, lavishly refurbishing already exquisite offices,
and ownership of vacation homes.67 One CEO, Vikram Pandit of Citigroup,
pledged to cut his own salary to one dollar until Citigroup returned to
profitability.68
Although Congress dropped President Obama’s request for a strict cap on
compensation from the final bill, the ARRA made substantial amendments to
the executive compensation regulations of EESA.69 Because the reforms on
executive pay apply to any business with an outstanding obligation arising
from participation in TARP, institutions which voluntarily agreed to
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participate under the executive compensation rules of EESA are now subject
to the heightened restrictions of ARRA.
PART II—LIMITATIONS SET ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION BY
EESA AND ARRA
Round One: The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
President George W. Bush signed the final version of EESA70 into law on
October 3, 2008.71 Section 111 of the bill, entitled “Executive Compensation
and Corporate Governance” contains the bulk of limitations placed on
executive compensation.72 It provides limitations on pay deemed excessive,
prohibits incentives that encourage unnecessary risk taking, and forbids
golden parachute payouts to executives of financial institutions that receive
bailout funds.73 In spite of the bellicose public discourse about the need to
control executive compensation, the final provisions of the bill failed to rein
in the perceived excesses of executive compensation.
First, limitations on executive pay apply only to firms who received
TARP assistance.74 The Secretary of the Treasury uses TARP funds to
promote market stability by purchasing troubled assets, such as mortgage
backed securities, in exchange for non-voting preferred stock and warrants for
common stock from participating corporations.75 These sales create corporate
obligations to the United States government, and corporations are subject to
the limitations so long as the obligations are outstanding. As of March 10,
2009, almost 400 institutions have participated in the program by selling
assets to the U.S. government.76
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Limitations That Satisfy “Appropriate Standards”
In order to receive assistance, corporations participating in TARP must
sign an agreement stating they will obey the limitations on executive pay
promulgated by section 111 and the Treasury Department.77 In section 111,
Congress delegated the burden to set limitations, or “appropriate standards”
for executives’ compensation,78 to the Treasury Department. The assignment
was not entirely lacking direction; Congress mandated that the Treasury’s
standards satisfy certain criteria.
The limitations must exclude forms of incentive-based compensation that
encourage senior executive officers (SEOs) to take unnecessary risk.79 A
“senior executive officer” is defined as any of the top five “highly paid
executives” whose compensation must be reported to the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.80
“Unnecessary risk” is not defined.
1. Compensation Committees
Under the regulations the Treasury Department promulgated, corporate
boards must appoint independent compensation committees in order to prevent
compensation that encourages unnecessary risk.81 These committees must
review the contracts of SEOs with company risk officers to ensure that “SEO
incentive compensation arrangements do not encourage SEOs to take
unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the TARP
recipient.”82 In order to comply, the committee should identify any short-term
or long-term risks the contracts may encourage, and then proceed to limit
compensation so that SEOs are not “encouraged to take [such] risks.”83 Also,
the committee must certify to the Treasury that the committee complied with
all review requirements, and “must provide an explanation of how their senior
executive compensation arrangements do not encourage excessive and
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unnecessary risk-taking.”84 Committees must review SEO contracts annually
while corporate TARP obligations remain outstanding.85
Although these regulations on their face appear to place heavy burdens
on participating institutions, in practice, institutions would likely have to make
few changes. First, in order to receive the deduction for performance-based
pay allowed under section 162 of the Tax Code, corporations must already
have independent compensation committees established to certify that
performance goals have been met and a majority of shareholders voted to
approve the terms and payment of the performance-based remuneration.86
Moreover, any company that is publicly traded on the NASDAQ or the NYSE
must have an independent compensation committee review executive
compensation.87 All of the nine “systemically significant” financial institutions
are publicly traded on either the NASDAQ or the NYSE.88
2. Claw-backs
The “appropriate standards” must also include a provision that allows for
the claw-back of any bonus compensation payments made to SEOs based on
financial reports later found to be inaccurate.89 This provision is similar to
Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 304, which provides for the disgorgement of
bonus payments or profits made on securities sales of CEOs and CFOs.90
However, unlike section 304, there is not a limited recovery period. The
provision applies to inaccuracies in both accounting and performance metrics,
and claw-back is required whenever a material inaccuracy is found.91
Nevertheless, this provision in no way limits executives’ compensation
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packages; it merely provides a means for corporations to recover
compensation payments that should not have been made.
3. Golden Parachutes
The final Treasury limitation is a provision prohibiting the payment of
golden parachute payments.92 Golden parachute payments are large payments
made in connection with the termination of an executive’s employment.93
These types of payments were a major talking point in the discourse
surrounding the bailout negotiations.94 Although, on its face, the provision
prevents employers from making golden parachute payments, the section (d)
sunset provision provides a large loophole which renders the parachute
prohibition ineffectual.95 Section (d) permits payments on golden parachute
clauses that were contracted for prior to the corporate receipt of TARP
funds.96 A corporation need only to negotiate any golden parachute clauses
before participating in TARP to work around the parachute proscription of
section (b)(2)(C).
In addition to the regulations of section 111, section 302 amends the
limitation on salary deductions permitted under section 162 of the Tax Code.97
Under the amended version, firms participating in TARP are limited to a
$500,000 rather than a $1 million deduction for executive salaries.98
As noted earlier, these provisions were ultimately ineffective in curbing
excessive compensation. Wall Street bonuses for 2008 exceeded $18 billion;
and firms receiving TARP funds paid out $1.6 billion in compensation.99
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Round Two: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
The ARRA provisions targeted at reining in excessive executive pay are
located in Title VII, “Limits on Executive Compensation.”100 Working within
the framework of the first bailout bill, Congress made significant amendments
to the controls on executive pay. With some of the amendments, Congress
took matters into its own hands by enacting express restrictions on pay.
Although these restrictions are meaningful, of more consequence is
Congress’s decision to grant the Executive its own authority to limit executive
compensation.
Amending Section 111
In the ARRA, Congress opted to amend the “appropriate standards” of the
EESA’s section 111. The amendments are applicable to any company, public
or private, that has received or seeks to receive funds from the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008.101 Similar to original section 111, section (b)(3)(B) provides for
recovery of any bonus or incentive payments made on the basis of financial
statements found to be materially inaccurate.102 However, the scope of this
provision was expanded so that it applies to any “senior executive officer and
any of the next 20 most highly compensated employees” in firms that received
TARP funding.103
Section (b)(3)(C) addresses the aforementioned weakness of the golden
parachute sunset provision in section (d) of EESA. Under the modified
provision, firms who receive TARP aid may not make golden parachute
payments to senior executives, and the next five most highly compensated
employees while any obligations arising from TARP assistance remain
outstanding.104
The ARRA retains TARP recipients’ obligation to establish “Independent
Compensation Committees.”105 In each fiscal year, TARP recipients must
provide the Treasury with a narrative describing how each affected
350 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:335
106. Id.
107. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(e) (Supp. 2009).
108. Frank Ahrens, The Ticker—Obama: Big Wall Street Bonuses “Shameful,” WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/economy-watch/2009/01/obama_big_wall_street_bonuses.html;
David R. Sands, Bankers Deny Misusing TARP Money, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/12/bankers-defend-record-use-bailout-funds/?page=2.
109. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(d) (Supp. 2009).
110. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(d).
111. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(d).
112. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 113, 28,417
(June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 30.12).
113. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (Supp. 2009).
114. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(D).
115. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(i)(I).
116. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(ii)(II–IV).
employee’s compensation complies with the compensation limitations and the
changes made to their compensation packages.106 Also, section (e) requires
annual shareholder voting on executive compensation plans, commonly known
as a “say on pay vote”; however, this vote is non-binding on the Board of
Directors.107
Congress responded to reports of TARP recipient’s expenditures on
luxury executive bathroom renovations and plans to purchase corporate jets
by adding section (d).108 Section (d) places limitations on corporate policies
and expenditures in regards to luxury expenditures.109 Luxury expenditures are
those expenses the Treasury Secretary deems excessive or a luxury.110 These
may include, but are not limited to, expenses for entertainment, office
renovations, and aviation or other transportation.111 Corporate boards must
adopt and publish an “excessive or luxury policy” to comply with these
requirements.112
Limitations on Incentive-Based Compensation
The most aggressive limitations established by Congress are found in
(b)(3)(D). This section prohibits TARP recipients from paying or accruing
bonus or incentive-based payments while TARP obligations remain
outstanding.113 In addition, disbursements of stock as compensation are limited
to long-term options that cannot vest until the firms repay all obligations
arising from TARP assistance.114 The value of these options cannot exceed
one-third of total annual compensation.115 These provisions can apply to
employees and are not necessarily limited to SEO’s.116
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The applicability of compensation limitations the provision imposes is
dependent on the amount of funding received. For firms who receive less than
$25,000,000 in TARP assistance, bonus limitations apply only to the most
highly-compensated employee.117 For firms receiving between $25,000,000
and $250,000,000, compensation limitations apply to the five most
highly-compensated employees.118 For firms receiving between $250,000,000
and $500,000,000, limitations shall apply to senior executive officers and the
ten next most highly-compensated employees.119 Finally, for firms receiving
over $500,000,000, limitations shall apply to senior executive officers and the
twenty next most highly-compensated employees.120 This final section of
limitations would apply to every major bank that received TARP assistance
in late 2008, including: Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of
America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs.121 It would also include major
auto makers General Motors and Chrysler.122 In all cases, the Secretary of the
Treasury may elect to impose these conditions on a broader range of
employees if the Secretary determines it serves the interest of the public.123
Although these provisions limit corporations’ ability to compensate their
employees, they only apply to employment agreements entered into after
February 11, 2009.124 This provision allows recipients of bailout funds to
make contractually agreed upon bonus payments regardless of the amount of
TARP funds received. This provision accords with the Treasury Secretary’s
decision not to affect changes to executive compensation limitations for the
firms participating in the first round of TARP.125
The Executive’s New Powers of Review and Revise
The real teeth for the limitations placed on executive pay in the ARRA
are found in the expansion of executive authority. Section (f) authorizes and
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to review the “bonus, retention awards,
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and other compensation paid to senior executive officers and the next twenty
most highly-compensated employees of each entity receiving TARP
assistance” prior to the enactment of ARRA.126 Should the Secretary deem any
such payments contrary to public interest or inconsistent with the premise of
TARP, he must negotiate with the TARP recipient and employee for
reimbursement of the compensation or bonus to the Federal Government.127
To comply with section (f), the Treasury created “The Office of the
Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation,” also known as “the Pay
Czar,” and appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg as the first American Pay Czar.
Mr. Feinberg must review all bonus payments paid by TARP recipients before
February 17, 2009.128 Should he determine the payments were contrary to the
policy of section 111 of the ARRA, Mr. Feinberg must negotiate with the
TARP recipient and employee for reimbursement of the payment to the U.S.
Government.129
Mr. Feinberg also has the duty to review and approve the compensation
plans for SEOs and the 100 most highly compensated employees at all
corporations receiving “exceptional assistance” or $500,000,000 in
assistance.130 He has the authority to disapprove compensation arrangements
that he deems excessive, inappropriate, or unsound.131 Corporations are
obligated to produce all documentation the Special Master requires to
complete the compensation plan reviews.132
The Pay Czar, backed by the executive, appears committed to reining in
excessive executive compensation. Mr. Feinberg has asserted his authority and
intention to review and revise previous bonus payouts and current
compensation packages of all TARP recipients despite the limiting statutory
provision and the Treasury Department’s earlier claim that compensation
limitations will not apply to agreements entered into prior to February 11,
2009.133 According to the Pay Czar, his review will include corporations that
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no longer have TARP obligations outstanding, e.g. Goldman Sachs and J.P.
Morgan.134
Overall Effect on TARP Recipient Corporations
Some critics of the amendments argue the provisions fall short of
effectively reining in the excesses of corporate compensation.135 One potential
loophole would be for compensation committees to simply raise base salaries
of corporate executives. Although the amended section 111 places strict
limitations on bonus payments, it does not place caps on all forms of
compensation. Despite President Obama’s plan to cap all compensation at
$500,000, the ARRA in no way restricts or limits salary payments. Typically,
corporations take advantage of section 162(m) of the Tax Code, which allows
corporations to deduct payments to employees, by paying executives salaries
under $1,000,000; the vast majority of compensation comes in the form of
incentive-based pay. However EESA amended section 162(m), limiting salary
expenditures for TARP recipients to $500,000.136 Compensation committees
could choose to forgo tax benefits. By increasing an executive’s fixed salary,
corporations could maintain the value of corporate compensation packages.
If a committee decided to evade compensation limitations, it would result in
greater tax revenue for the federal government.
Nevertheless, the limitations on executive pay implemented in the ARRA
are drastically different from those of the EESA. Unlike EESA regulations,
the limitations imposed by the ARRA will significantly change how TARP
participants compensate their employees.137 One of the most dramatic shifts
are the potential limitations of (b)(3)(D). Depending on the regulations the
Treasury adopts, these limitations have the potential for capping compensation
on all employees.138 Most importantly, the Pay Czar may force TARP
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participants to recoup bonus payments and change their current compensation
packages.
PART III—CORPORATE DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN TARP
The chief executives of the nine largest banks in the United States trooped into a
gilded conference room at the Treasury Department at 3 p.m. Monday. To their
astonishment, they were each handed a one-page document that said they agreed to
sell shares to the government, then Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said
they must sign it before they left.
“It was a take it or take it offer,” said one person who was briefed on the meeting,
speaking on condition of anonymity because the discussions were private. “Everyone
knew there was only one answer.”—The New York Times139
After over three hours of deliberation, all nine institutions capitulated to
Secretary Paulson’s demand to participate in TARP. The choice to acquiesce
did not come easy for every CEO. The decision to participate in TARP puts
corporate directors and executives in a unique position. As noted, the aid
comes with many strings attached, including: increased compliance costs,
forcing corporations to make substantial adjustments in their business plans
and corporate structure, and subjects Board of Director decisions to oversight
by the Treasury Secretary and Pay Czar that carry the potential for corporate
and federal claw-back of misused corporate funds. The ARRA provisions are
also potentially damaging to shareholders, because corporations must issue
preferred shares and warrants for common stock in exchange for TARP aid,
thereby diluting each shareholder’s ownership. Most importantly to the
discussion at hand, a vote to obtain TARP assistance by a director is in effect
a vote to lower their own pay.
As Secretary Paulson predicted during the negotiations of EESA,
restrictions on executive compensation endangered the participation of
financial institutions.140 During the meeting, Richard Kovacevich, CEO of
Wells Fargo, fought against Paulson’s proposal by raising concerns over the
restrictions on executive compensation.141 At the time, Mr. Kovacevich’s
severance entitlements totaled nearly $200,000,000.142 Kenneth Lewis, CEO
of Bank of America, responded to concerns over the restrictions by urging
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other executives to participate. He reportedly remarked, [if we let executive
compensation block the bailout we are out of our minds.143
Assuming Secretary Paulson was correct in his assertion that some firms
would not have agreed to participate in TARP had stricter limitations been
placed on executive compensation, congressional action to initially set lower
standards in order to encourage participation and then change the standards
after the fact amounts to a bait and switch. Had the nine CEOs known about
the strict restrictions that would be ultimately placed on corporations and
compensation packages, perhaps Mr. Kovacevich’s position would have won
the day. But was the political posturing really necessary? In other words,
could executives decide not to participate solely because of restrictions placed
on their own compensation?
A board’s decision not to participate in TARP would most likely
withstand a challenge brought by a shareholder or other interested party in a
court of law.144 Generally speaking, a corporate board has “the authority and
broad discretion to make executive compensation decisions.”145 This position
is supported by state corporate statutes, including Delaware’s, and by the
Model Business Corporation Act of 1984.146 As such, decisions pertaining to
executive compensation will generally be afforded the protection of the
business judgment rule.147
In order to overcome the business judgment rule presumption, a
challenger would need to show “the directors are interested or lack
independence relative to the decision.”148 Directors who have an interest in a
transaction potentially violate their duty of loyalty owed to the corporation
and its shareholders. The duty of loyalty “mandates that the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders take precedence over any interest possessed
by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the
stockholders generally.”149
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On its face, the decision not to participate in TARP because of
restrictions placed on compensation appears to be a self-interested transaction.
Directors are placed in a position where ratification of a transaction could
damage their interest (that is, their interest in receiving compensation) while
rejection would place their interests, not shared by the stockholders, over
those of the corporation. Take, for example, Mr. Kovacevich who was entitled
to almost $200,000,000 in severance payments when he decided Wells Fargo
would participate in TARP. In 2007, Mr. Kovacevich’s cash compensation
was $6,695,000, of which only $995,000 was salary; the remainder of his
compensation was bonus payments.150 Under the executive compensation rules
of ARRA, Mr. Kovacevich stands to have a significant reduction in income,
assuming his compensation plan does not change.151 Furthermore, if
Mr. Kovacevich were to leave Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo would not legally be
permitted to make a substantial portion of those payments.152
The transaction boils down to a choice between serving the corporation’s
interests or serving his own interests. By agreeing to participate in TARP,
Mr. Kovacevich would be effectively limiting his compensation by over 80%,
while, arguably, increasing the financial well-being of his institution.153 By
refusing to participate, Mr. Kovacevich compensation would remain
unchanged. On the other hand, Wells Fargo would have missed out on a
substantial opportunity for capital infusion. The duty of loyalty seemingly
mandates Mr. Kovacevich to opt to participate in TARP.154
Despite the clear self-interest in the above transaction, such a decision
would still likely withstand a legal challenge, and may even be afforded the
protection of the business judgment rule.155 All states, such as Delaware,
provide a safe harbor for corporate boards dealing with self-interest in
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transactions.156 Assuming the decision to not participate in TARP was reached
with due care, a safe harbor rule could provide the board’s decision with
business judgment rule protection.157
Should a court decide not to give deference to the board’s decision under
the protection of the business judgment rule, the court would then evaluate the
transactions ultimate fairness to the corporation. A court would likely ratify
the board’s decision. Although a corporate board has a significant self-interest
in rejecting TARP funds, accepting funds places significant burdens on
financial institutions. These burdens include significant government intrusion
in to the corporate board room, increased costs associated with dividend
payments on the preferred shares financial institutions must pay to the
government as owner of these shares, and the potential for dilution of
shareholder ownership if the warrants for common shares were exercised.158
Dividend payments alone are likely enough to justify a board’s decision
to reject TARP funds. Take for example Wells Fargo, discussed above. By
rejecting TARP funds. Mr. Kovecevich would be preserving for himself $5.7
million in compensation. Although this compensation would come from
corporate coffers, it pales in comparison to the costs levied in dividend
payments that accompany accepting the funds. On February 2, 2009, Wells
Fargo paid its first dividend to the U.S. government; the dividend required the
corporation to pay the government over $370 million.159 This payment
represents only a quarter of the total dividends Wells Fargo is required to pay
for 2009.160
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PART IV—POSTURING FOR NOTHING
How do you give a bonus to someone for having failed so badly as many of these
people did?
—Representative Barney Frank161
Despite a corporate board’s prerogative to reject bailout funds, all of the
systematically significant institutions agreed to accept the capital infusion
from TARP. Participation in the program was considerable. In that regard, the
legislators were effective. As a result, the feared catastrophic collapse may
have been avoided. As of the time of publication in Spring 2010, the U.S.
economy appears to be on the verge of recovery. There are no soup lines.
Similarly, more time is needed to evaluate how effective Congress was
in protecting taxpayer investments via limitations on compensation. In the first
round of the bailout legislative efforts were nominal at best. Any institution
that participated in a transaction under the first phase of the bailout entered
into an agreement with the Treasury Department.162 These various agreements
of individual institutions are substantively quite similar. As part of each
agreement, each institution was required to recognize and take the necessary
steps to comply with the executive compensation rules promulgated by the
Treasury as authorized by the EESA. Although taxpayer outrage over the
bonus payments made by bailed out corporations may be legitimate, in no way
did those firms breach their legal commitments entered into with the Treasury
Department.
Despite the lawfulness of the payments, the taxpayers may still receive
the protection they demand. The limitations passed in the ARRA could
severely constrain compensation packages. Moreover, portions of the bonuses
already paid by TARP recipients may have to be returned to the Federal
Government. The extent to which the Treasury Department, and Pay Czar
Kenneth Feinberg, will exercise their authority remain uncertain.163
Effectiveness aside, the Congressional efforts to address the two problems
of economic stabilization and excessive compensation could have been
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handled better. By using the bailout legislation to address executive
compensation, Congress tied its own hands. It was forced to legislate
ineffective limitations in order to promote participation in the scheme. Once
the populist rage boiled over, Congress responded by placing new regulations
on firms that agreed to participate in TARP under the rules enacted in the
ESSA. For political leaders to attack corporations and their executives for
making bonus payments that complied with the rules those same politicians
crafted was beyond hypocritical, it was repugnant.164
Had Congress separated its solutions to the two distinct problems, it could
have better used the political capital to achieve real gains rather than wasting
it on encouraging participation in the TARP scheme that achieved only
nominal compensation reform. For example, Congress could have compelled
banks accepting assistance to increase lending. Moreover, the limitations on
executive pay are limited to a discrete sector of the economy. By addressing
excessive compensation in a separate Act of Congress, reform could have
been more widespread and lasting. Rather than lumping the solutions to many
problems together in one massive bill, perhaps its time for change. Next time,
Congress should concentrate on solving one crisis at a time.
